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DICKERSON v. UNITED STATES: THE
CASE THAT DISAPPOINTED MIRANDA’S
CRITICS – AND THEN ITS SUPPORTERS*

By
Yale Kamisar**

INTRODUCTION

It is difficult, if not impossible, to discuss Dickerson1 intelligently without discussing
Miranda,2 whose constitutional status Dickerson reaffirmed (or, one might say, resuscitated). It
is also difficult, if not impossible, to discuss the Dickerson case intelligently without discussing
cases the Court has handed down in the five years since Dickerson was decided. The hard truth
is that in those five years the reaffirmation of Miranda’s constitutional status has become less
and less meaningful.
In this paper I want to focus on the Court’s characterization of statements elicited in
violation of the Miranda warnings as not actually “coerced” or “compelled” but obtained merely

*

This paper is based on a talk given at a conference on the Rehnquist Legacy held at he
University of Indiana (Bloomington) Law School on April 1-2, 2005. A revised version will
appear as a chapter of a book edited by Professor Craig Bradley on the Rehnquist Legacy.
**

Professor of Law, University of San Diego; Clarence Darrow Distinguished University
Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan. I am grateful to Craig Bradley for his
helpful comments.
1

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).

2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1
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in violation of Miranda’s “prophylactic rules.” This terminology has plagued the Miranda
doctrine and puzzled and provoked many commentators since then-Justice Rehnquist utilized this
label to describe and to diminish Miranda – and he was the first Justice ever to do so – thirty-one
years ago
At that time, Justice Rehnquist observed for the Court: “[T]he police conduct at issue
here did not abridge respondent’s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, but departed
only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by the Court in Miranda to safeguard the
privilege.”3
Rehnquist’s opinion for a 7-2 majority in Dickerson calls Miranda “a constitutional
decision of this Court,”4 a case that “announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not
supersede legislatively,”5 and one that “laid down ‘concrete constitutional guidelines for law
enforcement agencies and courts to follow.’”6 But the “prophylactic” language has not
disappeared. Indeed, since Dickerson was decided the Chief Justice has joined two plurality
opinions that refer to the Miranda rules as “a prophylactic employed to protect against violations

3

Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445-46 (1974). Justice Rehnquist was not the first
Justice to describe the Miranda rules as “prophylactic” (Justice Powell was), but the first to use
this terminology to disparage Miranda. In Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973) in the
course of explaining and defending a presumption designed to protect against indicative
sentencing when a defendant is retried, Powell spoke approvingly of Miranda. He considered
the rule protecting against vindictive sentencing “analogous to Miranda.”
4

Dickerson, p. 432.

5

Id. at 444.

6

Id. at 435 (quoting from Miranda).
2
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of the Self-Incrimination Clause”7 and as “prophylactic rules designed to safeguard the core
constitutional right protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause.”8
REHNQUIST ’S VIEWS ON THE WARREN COURT ’S
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES BEFORE ASCENDING
TO THE

SUPREME COURT

Mark Tushnet, the author of a new book on the Rehnquist Court, informs us that
Rehnquist kept in mind “the constitutional theories of Robert Jackson, the Supreme Court justice
for whom he had clerked,”9 and that “to understand Rehnquist, it helps to understand Jackson.”10
If so, this helps explain why Rehnquist did not welcome the Warren Court’s “revolution” in
American criminal procedure.
In a famous 1944 confession case, Ashcraft v. Tennessee,11 a majority of the Court
concluded that thirty-six hours of continuous relay interrogation was “inherently coercive.” It is
hard to believe that anybody would disagree with that conclusion today.12 But when Ashcraft

7

United States v. Patane, 124 S.Ct. 2620, 2626 (2004) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C. J., & Scalia, J.).
8

Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770 (2003) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., &
O’Connor & Scalia, J.).
9

MARK TUSHNET , A COURT DIVIDED : THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9 (2005).
10

Id. at 14.

11

322 U.S. 143.

12

Cf. Scalia, J., dissenting in Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 164 (1990): “We are
authorized by the Fifth Amendment to exclude confessions that are ‘compelled,’ which we have
interpreted to include confessions that the police obtain from a suspect in custody without a
knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to remain silent. Undoubtedly some bright-line rules
3
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was decided, Justice Jackson wrote a powerful dissent, severely criticizing the majority for
departing from the traditional “due process”/”totality of the circumstances”/”voluntariness” test.13
Five years later, in another coerced confession case, Watts v. Indiana,14 concurring Justice
Jackson warned that the Bill of Rights, as interpreted by the Supreme Court up to that time, had
imposed “the maximum restrictions upon the power of organized society over the individual that
are compatible with the maintenance of organized society itself” – good reason for not indulging
in any further expansive interpretation of them.15
Justice Jackson’s 1949 observation about the Bill of Rights imposing the maximum
restrictions on organized society allowable is worth dwelling on. I have little doubt that many
shared Jackson’s view at the time.16 But looking back on it more than a half-century later,
Jackson’s comment seems astonishing.
Jackson’s observation was made more than a decade before the Warren Court’s
“revolution” in criminal procedure got underway. Although the right to counsel has aptly been
called ‘the most pervasive” right of an accused “for it affects his ability to assert any other rights

can be adopted to implement that principle, marking out the situations in which knowledge or
voluntariness cannot possibly be established – for example, a rule excluding confessions
obtained after five hours of continuous interrogation.”
13

See 322 U.S. at 164-67. Justices Roberts and Frankfurter joined Jackson’s dissent.

14

338 U.S. 49 (1949).

15

Id. at 61.

16

When I started teaching law in 1957, I had the distinct impression that a goodly number
of my colleagues and many of my students agreed with Jackson.
4
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he may have,17 1949 was a time when the U.S. Constitution, as then interpreted, did not entitle
indigent defendants in non-capital state criminal prosecutions, to appointed counsel.18 Thus, in
some states whose own laws or court rules did not provide for appointed counsel, indigent
persons charged with such serious crimes as manslaughter and armed robbery had to fend for
themselves. Nineteen forty-nine was also a time when there were no constitutional constraints on
pre-trial identification (indeed, there was no constitutional restrictions on one-person lineups)19 –
even though mistaken identification has probably been the single greatest cause of conviction of
the innocent.20
Moreover, 1949 was a time when many state courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court as well,
were upholding the admissibility of confessions obtained under conditions that would jolt many
of us today.21 It was also a time when state courts were free to admit illegally seized evidence –
and most of them did so.22

17

Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8

(1956).
18

The Supreme Counsel did not construe the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as
requiring indigent defendants who could not afford a lawyer to be provided with appointed
counsel in non-capital state prosecutions until 1963. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335.
19

The Supreme Court did not begin to address the problem of lineups and other pretrial
identifications until 1967, when it decided a trilogy of cases: United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263; and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293.
20

See Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the
Criminal Cases, 1974 U.Ill.L.F. 518, 541-42.
21

See, e.g. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).

22

In 1949, thirty-one states admitted evidence seized in violation of the protection against
unreasonable search and seizure, including California, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio and
Pennsylvania. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29, 38 (1949), overruled, Mapp v. Ohio 367
5
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Mark Tushnet also tells us that although he harbored no hatred or disdain for African
Americans, Rehnquist was “simply indifferent” to their situation and “placed the claims of the
civil rights movement in a framework of constitutional theory shaped by his experience as
Jackson’s law clerk.”23 Nor did his views change. Years later, as an important player in
Goldwater’s effort to transform the Republican Party, Rehnquist was of the view, Tushnet tells
us, “that advocates of civil rights were going too far, trampling on other important constitutional
values in their misguided effort to cleanse the United States of racism.”24
This is another reason why Rehnquist was unlikely to be impressed by – or even see the
need for – the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution. As Dean Kenneth Pye observed as
the Warren Court era was coming to an end:
The Court’s concern with criminal procedure can be understood only in the
context of the struggle for civil rights. . . . Concern with civil rights almost
inevitably required attention to the rights of defendants in criminal cases. It is
hard to conceive of a Court that would accept the challenge of guaranteeing the
rights of Negroes and other disadvantaged groups to equality before the law and at
the same time do nothing to ameliorate the invidious discrimination between rich
and poor which existed in the criminal process. . .
If the Court’s espousal of equality before the law was to be credible, it required
not only that the poor Negro be permitted to vote and to attend a school with
whites, but also that he and other disadvantaged individuals be able to exercise, as
well as possess, the same rights as the affluent white when suspected of crime.25

U.S. 643 (1961).
23

Tushnet 23.

24

Id.

25

A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 Mich.L.Rev. 249, 256

(1968).
6
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So far I have been largely speculating about why Rehnquist was probably discontented
with Miranda and other Warren Court criminal cases before he himself was appointed to the
Supreme Court. But there is more direct – and quite powerful – evidence of Rehnquist’s
displeasure with the so-called criminal procedure revolution – a memorandum he wrote when he
worked for the Nixon Administration.
On April 1, 1969, when he had been Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of
Legal Counsel for less than ninety days, Rehnquist sent a nineteen-page memorandum to John
Dean (of Watergate fame), then the Associate Deputy Attorney General. The memorandum
charged that “there is reason to believe that the Supreme Court has failed to hold true the balance
between the right of society to convict the guilty and the obligation of society to safeguard the
accused.”26 Therefore, recommended Rehnquist, “the President [should] appoint a Commission
to review these decisions, to determine whether the overriding public interest in law enforcement
. . . requires a constitutional amendment.”27
Although Rehnquist’s memorandum complained about other matters, such as the ban on
comments about the defendant’s refusal to take the stand in his own defense, the search and
seizure exclusionary rule, and the sharp increase in habeas corpus petitions,28 its heaviest fire was

26

Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist to John W. Dean, III, re: Constitutional
Decisions Relating to Criminal Law, April 1, 1969, Summary of Memorandum, p. 2. The
memorandum was marked “administratively confidential,” which, according to Dean, “kept it
locked up for many years.” JOHN W. DEAN , THE REHNQUIST CHOICE 268 (2001). I am indebted
to Professor Thomas Y. Davies of the University of Tennessee College of Law for calling this
memorandum to my attention and providing me with a copy (which he obtained from the
National Archives).
27

Id.

28

See id at 6, 8-9, 12-14.
7
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directed at Miranda:
The past decade has witnessed a dramatic change in the interpretation given by the
Supreme Court of the United States to the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants. Limitations both drastic and novel have been placed on the use by
both the state and federal governments of pre-trial statements of the
defendants....29
The impact of Miranda and its progeny on the practices of law enforcement
officials is far-reaching.
The Court is now committed to the proposition that relevant, competent,
uncoerced statements of the defendant will not be admissible at his trial unless an
elaborate set of warnings be given which is very likely to have the effect of
preventing a defendant from making any statement at all. As Mr. Justice Jackson
observed in Watts v. Indiana [a confession case discussed in the text at note 14
supra]:
“Any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain
terms to make no statement under any circumstances.”30

The Rehnquist memorandum then made an argument that other critics of the Warren
Court’s criminal cases, and Miranda particularly, have made:31
The Court, believing that the poor, disadvantaged criminal defendant should be
made just as aware of the risk of incriminating himself as the rich, well-counseled
criminal defendant, has undoubtedly put an additional hurdle in the way of

29

Id. at 1.

30

Id. at 5. In the Miranda context, the quotation from Justice Jackson is somewhat
misleading. A suspect can waive his Miranda rights and agree to talk to the police without ever
consulting with an attorney – and, as every student of police interrogation agrees today, the great
majority of suspects do waive their right to counsel, as well as their right to remain silent. As
Justice O’Connor emphasized in Moran v. Burbine, 475 US. 412, 426 (1986), Miranda rejected
the argument – what the Burbine Court called “the more extreme position” – that the actual
presence of a lawyer is necessary to dispel the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation.
31

See, e.g., Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 Vand.L.Rev. 1417, 1471-73

(1985).
8
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convicting the guilty.32

I find two things especially interesting about the Rehnquist memorandum:
First of all, Rehnquist never mentions a provision of Title II of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (usually called § 3501 because of its designation under
Title 18 of the United States Code) that purports to abolish Miranda and to make the preMiranda “voluntariness” rule the sole test for the admissibility of confessions in federal
prosecutions. This strikes me as astonishing.
How could the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel write
a good-sized memorandum spelling out the need for a commission to consider repealing or
greatly modifying Miranda by constitutional amendment without making any reference to a
recently enacted federal law purporting to overturn Miranda? Rehnquist was too good a lawyer,
and the nineteen-page document he authored was too carefully written, for him to miss a tenmonth old statute that had an important bearing on the subject of his memorandum. (Moreover,
presumably some of the bright lawyers in his office must have contributed to, or at least seen, a
draft of the memorandum.)
One cannot help wondering whether Rehnquist ignored § 3501 because he thought it was
obviously unconstitutional. It would hardly be surprising if he did.
Only a few days before Rehnquist finished writing the memorandum, the Supreme Court
had reversed a conviction because “the use of these admissions obtained in the absence of the
required warnings was a flat violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment

32

Rehnquist memorandum, p. 5.
9
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as construed in Miranda.”33 No member of the Court seemed troubled by this language. Indeed,
Justice Harlan, one of the Miranda dissenters, concurred in the result “purely out of respect for
stare decisis.”34
This brings me to the other interesting thing about the Rehnquist memorandum. No
doubt is expressed about Miranda’s constitutional status. Nowhere are the Miranda rules
described as “prophylactic” or “procedural” rules or “protective” of the Self-Incrimination
Clause. When he discussed Miranda in April, 1969, Rehnquist told us that although “[t]here
was no evidence of physical coercion [in Miranda and its three companion cases], nor were the
cases examples of unusual psychological pressure having been brought to bear in the
interrogation process,” the Court “held that the statements elicited from each of the defendants
violated the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.”35
This, too, is hardly surprising. The Miranda opinion itself never called the warnings
“prophylactic” or “not themselves right protected by the Constitution.”36 Nor did any of the three
Justices who wrote separate dissenting opinions.37 Justice White wrote the angriest and most-

33

Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969). Orozco was decided on March 25, 1969;
Rehnquist’s memorandum is dated April, 1969.
34

Id. at 328.

35

Rehnquist memorandum, pp. 4-5.

36

This is how the Court, speaking through Justice Rehnquist, characterized the Miranda
rules in Michigan v. Tucker, p. 444.
37

Justice White did say, 384 U.S. at 544, that “the Court’s per se approach may not be
justified on the ground that it provides a ‘bright line,’” but he did not suggest that there was
anything “illegitimate” or improper about a per se approach or a rule that provides a “bright
line.” One could plausibly say that when Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) overturned
the old “special circumstances” rule for appointing counsel and held that indigent non-capital
10
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quoted dissent, but he called the Miranda holding a “reinterpretation of the Fifth amendment”38
and, although he disagreed, he saw nothing “illegitimate” or improper about it. Indeed, he called
Miranda the “mak[ing] [of] new law and new public policy in much the same way [the Court has
gone about] interpreting other great clauses of the Constitution.”39
A year later, in an address he gave at the annual meeting of the Conference of Chief
Justices, an address that has never received the attention I think it deserves, Justice White made
clear that, as much as he disagreed with the result in Miranda, he considered the decision a
straightforward interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination:
Is the arrested suspect, alone with the police in the station house, being
“compelled” to incriminate himself when he is interrogated without proper
warnings? Reasonable men may differ about the answer to that question, but the
question itself is a perfectly straightforward one under the Fifth Amendment and
little different in kind from many others which arise under the Constitution and
which must be decided by the courts. . . . The answer lies in the purpose and
history of the self-incrimination clause and in our accumulated experience.
. . . In terms of the function which the Court was performing, I see little
difference between Miranda and the several other decisions, some old, some new,
which have construed the Fifth Amendment in a manner in which it has never
been construed before, or as in the case of Miranda, contrary to previous decisions
of the Court and of other courts as well.40

defendants had an unqualified, automatic right to appointed counsel in all serious state criminal
prosecutions, the Court adopted a per se approach that provided a “bright line.”
38

384 U.S. at 531.

39

Id. at 531.

40

Justice Byron R. White, Recent Developments in Criminal Law, Address Before the
Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices (Aug. 3, 1967), in COUNCIL OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES (1967).
11
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THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MEMORANDUM AND
JUSTICE REHNQUIST ’S OPINION IN MICHIGAN V. TUCKER

At the time Rehnquist sent his memorandum to John Dean, it may fairly be said that there
was a wide consensus that Miranda was a straightforward interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination and that a confession elicited in violation of
the Miranda rules was one obtained in violation of the Constitution. A short time later, however,
that consensus came to an end.
In June, 1969, with the authorization of the head of the Department of Justice, Attorney
General John Mitchell, a memorandum “consistent with President Nixon’s frequent criticism of
Warren Court decisions on interrogation and related aspects of police procedure”41 was sent to all
United States Attorneys. It explained why “the failure to give the warnings required by Miranda
will not necessarily require exclusion of a resulting confession.”42
The DOJ memorandum made the best case – indeed, the only tenable case – ever made up
to that point for the constitutionality of § 3501. It foreshadowed the reasoning in later Supreme
Court opinions disparaging Miranda. I have in mind such cases as Michigan v. Tucker43 (which
allowed the testimony of a witness whose identity had been discovered as a result of questioning
the defendant without giving him a complete set of warnings), New York v. Quarles44 (another

41

OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 164 (1973).

42

Memorandum from the Department of Justice to the United States Attorneys (June 11,
1969), 5 Crim. L.Rep. (NBA) 2350 (1969).
43

417 U.S. 433 (1974).

44

467 U.S. 649 (1984).
12
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Rehnquist opinion, which recognized a “public safety” exception to the need for the Miranda
warnings and thus held admissible both the suspect’s statement, “the gun is over there,” and the
gun found as the result of the statement), and Oregon v. Elstad45 (an O’Connor opinion, where
the fact that the police had obtained a statement from defendant when they questioned him
without giving him the required Miranda warnings did not bar the admissibility of a subsequent
statement obtained at another place when, this time, the police did comply with Miranda).
The reasoning in the DOJ memorandum was quite similar to the reasoning of Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion in Tucker, an opinion, which, in turn, greatly influenced the way later cases
viewed Miranda. Indeed, looking back on the memorandum more than three decades later, it
seems to have provided a road map for those who wanted to read Miranda as narrowly as
possible.
Who wrote the 1969 Justice Department memorandum? Will Wilson, the Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, signed the communication to “United
States Attorneys,” notifying them that “[t]he attached memorandum sets forth the Department’s
position in respect to implementing” § 3501and another provision of the Crime Control Act of
1968 concerning the admissibility of eye-witness testimony.46 But who actually wrote “the
attached memorandum”?
The memorandum was described as Attorney General Mitchell’s memorandum, but
surely Mitchell did not write this memorandum by himself, if he contributed to it at all. The

45

470 U.S. 298 (1985).

46

See 5 Crim.L.Rep. At 2350. Wilson’s communication to United States Attorneys also
contained a brief summary of the arguments in the attached memorandum.
13
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memorandum skillfully dissected both the Miranda opinion and the text of § 3501. The writing
had a certain talmudic quality to it.
Assistant Attorney General Wilson may have had a hand in writing the memorandum.
What about Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist? Given his position and his earlier memo
disparaging Miranda, he seems an obvious choice.
Although Rehnquist had not mentioned § 3501 in his memorandum, there might be a
connection between Rehnquist’s memo and the Justice Department’s memorandum a short time
later defending the constitutionality of § 3501. At the time he rejected Rehnquist’s proposal,47
Attorney General Mitchell might have asked himself: Why do we need a constitutional
amendment to deal with Miranda when we already have a federal statute on the books that
purports to overturn that case? Surely the lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel can make a
credible argument that the statute is constitutional.
Whether or not Rehnquist contributed to the DOJ memorandum, he must have known
about it and studied it when the memorandum was sent to all United States Attorneys and
published in its entirety in the Criminal Law Reporter. After all, he was the head of the Office of
Legal Counsel. Whether or not he had a hand in writing it, he must have remembered it when he
wrote his first opinion of the Court in a Miranda case, the aforementioned Michigan v. Tucker. I
don’t think it can be denied that the arguments Justice Rehnquist makes in Tucker are quite
similar to those made five years earlier in the DOJ memorandum.

47

According to John Dean, Mitchell had a negative reaction to Rehnquist’s proposal
because he doubted whether the Nixon Administration could control a constitutional
commission. See Dean, supra, at 268.
14
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The 1969 memorandum emphasized (as Justice Rehnquist was to do in Tucker),48 that the
Miranda Court itself had recognized that the Constitution does not require adherence to “any
particular solution for the inherent compulsion of the interrogation process,”49 only compliance
with “some ‘system’ to safeguard against [the] inherently compulsive circumstances” which
jeopardize the privilege.50 Therefore, continued the DOJ memorandum, the Miranda warnings
“are not themselves constitutional absolutes.”51
Five years later, in Tucker, Justice Rehnquist was to point out that the Miranda Court had
observed that it could not say that “the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any
particular solution for the inherent compulsion of the interrogation process.”52 Therefore,
concluded Justice Rehnquist, the Miranda Court itself had recognized that the Miranda
safeguards “are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution.”53
All this is quite misleading. The Miranda warnings are not “constitutional absolutes” or
“not themselves rights protected by the Constitution” in the sense that another set of procedural
safeguards, another system to protect against the inherently compulsive circumstances of
custodial interrogation, might constitute a suitable substitute. Unfortunately, however, § 3501
did not provide a suitable substitute. Chief Justice Rehnquist was to make this very point a

48

See 417 U.S. at 444.

49

DOJ memorandum at 2351 (emphasis added).

50

Id. (emphasis in the original).

51

Id. at 2351-52.

52

417 U.S. at 444, quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added).

53

417 U.S. at 444.
15
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quarter-century later in Dickerson when he wrote the opinion of the Court invalidating § 3501:
When it had enacted the statutory provision known as § 3501, pointed out the Chief Justice,
Congress had “intended . . . to overrule Miranda” and simply replace it with the old “totality-ofthe-circumstances”/”voluntariness” test54 – one that the Miranda Court had found woefully
inadequate.
The author of the majority opinion in Tucker overlooked some key language in the
Miranda opinion:
We encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for
increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while
promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal law. However, unless we are
shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused
persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following safeguards [the Miranda warnings] must be observed.55

***

It is also urged upon us that we withhold decision on this issue until state
legislative bodies and advisory groups have had an opportunity to deal with these
problems by rule making. We have already pointed out that the Constitution does
not require any specific code of procedures for protecting the privilege against
self-incrimination during custodial interrogation . . .so long as they are fully as
effective as those described above [the Miranda warnings] in informing accused
persons of their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to
exercise it.56

***

54

See 530 U.S. at 436-37.

55

Id. at 467 (emphasis added).

56

Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
16
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We turn now [to the facts of the cases before us] to consider the application to
these cases of the constitutional principles discussed above. In each instance, we
have concluded that statements were obtained from the defendant under
circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the
privilege.57
In this respect, the 1969 DOJ memorandum – although it is a piece of advocacy straining
to make “a legitimate constitutional argument” in favor of § 350158 – is more balanced than
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Tucker. Unlike Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, the DOJ
memorandum does recognize that, although various alternatives to the method spelled out by
Chief Justice Warren for dispelling the inherent coercion of the custodial interrogation are
potentially available, “the [Miranda] Court stated, until such ‘potential alternatives for protecting
the privilege’ are devised by Congress and the states [384 U.S. at 467], a person must be warned
[in/accordance with Miranda] prior to any in-custody questioning.”59
As Geoffrey Stone described it many years ago, in what I consider the classic critique of
Tucker, Rehnquist’s reading of Miranda in 1974 constituted nothing less than a “rewriting” of
that famous case.60 That is a strong word, but I don’t think it is an exaggeration.
Although the Tucker opinion certainly suggested otherwise, absent any suitable substitute

57

Id. at 491 (emphasis added).

58

At one point (p. 2361), the memorandum states: “The area where we believe the statute
[§ 3601] can be effective and where a legitimate constitutional argument can be made is where a
voluntary confession is obtained after a less than perfect warning or a less than conclusive
waiver. . . .”
59

Id. (emphasis added).

60

In The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup.Ct.Rev. 99, Professor Stone
analyzed the first eleven cases involving Miranda decided by the Supreme Court since Warren
Burger became Chief Justice. The subheading for Stone’s ten-and-a-half analysis of Tucker was
“Miranda Rewritten.” See id. at 115.
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(and there was none in Tucker or any of the other post-Miranda cases), the Miranda warnings
are required to dispel the compelling pressures inherent in custodial interrogation. Absent an
equally effective alternative, the police must give an individual about to be subjected to custodial
questioning the Miranda warnings if the privilege is not to be violated.
To respond directly to the DOJ memorandum and Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Tucker,
absent another equally effective protective device, there is no gap between a violation of the
Miranda warnings and a violation of the privilege – in the context of custodial interrogation the
privilege and the Miranda warnings are inseparable. The Miranda warnings cannot be breached
without breaching the privilege as well.
Absent an adequate alternative, the Miranda warnings are not “suggested” safeguards (as
both the DOJ memorandum and the Tucker Court called them).61 Nor are they “recommended
procedural safeguards” (as the Tucker Court characterized then at one point).62 Neither are they
“protective guidelines” (as Tucker characterized them at another point).63
One may disagree strongly with the conclusions the Miranda Court reached. One may
even think the Miranda Court’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment was preposterous.
Nevertheless, according to Miranda, absent a suitable substitute, the warnings are “an absolute
prerequisite to interrogation”;64 they are safeguards required by the Constitution to prevent the
privilege from being violated.

61

DOJ memorandum at 2352; Tucker at 444.

62

Tucker, p. 443 (emphasis added).

63

Id. (emphasis added).

64

Miranda 471.
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In short, as Professor Stone expressed it, “the conclusion that a violation of Miranda is
not a violation of the privilege is flatly inconsistent with the Court’s declaration in Miranda that
‘[t]he requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth
Amendment privilege.’”65
Tucker did not only rewrite Miranda by driving a wedge between the privilege and the
Miranda warnings. It also rewrote Miranda by badly blurring the distinction between the
privilege against self-incrimination and the “voluntariness” doctrine, (the prevailing test for the
admissibility of confessions before Miranda applied the privilege to custodial interrogation).66
At one point, in discussing why the police conduct “did not deprive [Mr. Tucker] of his
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination as such,” but only the “procedural safeguards
associated with that right since Miranda,”67 Justice Rehnquist pointed out that Tucker’s
statements “could hardly be termed involuntary as that term has been defined in the decisions of
this Court.”68 This was one of the reasons the Tucker Court concluded that “the interrogation
involved no compulsion sufficient to breach the right against self-incrimination.”69
At another point, Rehnquist observed that there was no need to exclude the statement the
police obtained from Tucker, as a result of their uncoercive questioning, in order to protect the

65

Stone, supra, at 119, quoting Miranda at 476.

66

See Justice Rehnquist’s discussion of the pre-Miranda test in Tucker at pp. 441-43.

67

417 U.S. at 444.

68

Id. at 445.

69

Id.
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courts “from reliance on untrustworthy evidence”70 for such concerns arise only “[w]hen
involuntary statements or the right against compulsory self-incrimination are involved.”71
Compulsory self-incrimination cases, continued Rehnquist “must, by definition, involve an
element of coercion, since the Clause provides only that a person shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself.”72
Treating “coerced” and “compelled” interchangeably is confusing and misleading,
“Coerced” and “compelled” or “coercive” and “compelling” may have the same dictionary
meanings, but they are words of art with significantly different meanings.
When we talk about a “coerced” or “involuntary” confession, we mean a confession that
is inadmissible under the pre-Miranda due process/totality of circumstances test because, as the
courts usually put it when they apply such a test, taking into account the totality of circumstances,
the confession was not a “product of free choice” or “free will” but one where the defendant’s
will was “overborne” or “broken.”73 More oppressive police methods were needed to render a
confession “coerced” or “involuntary” under the pre-Miranda test for the admissibility of
confessions than are necessary to make a confession “compelled” within the meaning of the self-

70

Id. at 448.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, Constraints and Confessions, 74 Denver U.L.Rev. 957
(1997); Yale Kamisar, What Is An “Involuntary” Confession?, 17 Rutgers L.Rev. 728 (1963);
Monrad Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 Stan.L.Rev. 411 (1954).
See also the discussion in United States v. Rutledge, 900 F.2d 1127, 1129 (7th Cir. 1990), where
Judge Posner maintains that the rhetoric often used in coerced confession cases, such as “product
of a free choice,” is extremely unhelpful.
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incrimination clause. That, at least, is the premise of Miranda. And that, at least, appears to
have been the understanding of everyone involved in the case.
At one point during the oral arguments, Justice Harlan asked the lawyer for a defendant in
one of the companion cases to Miranda74 whether he was claiming that his client’s confession
was “coerced.” The lawyer, Victor Earle, replied:
In no sense. I don’t think it was coerced at all. Mr. Justice White asked yesterday
a question about compelling someone to give up his Fifth Amendment privilege. I
think there is a substantial difference between that and coercing a confession. I
mean, it wasn’t until 1964 that the Fifth Amendment privilege applied to the
states, and so . . . all through until the 1960's, really, state convictions were
overturned only by looking to the generality of the totality of circumstances under
the due process clause.
Now, we have specific constitutional guarantees that are applied in branch to the
states. . . . It is true that the word “compel” is used in the Fifth Amendment with
respect to the privilege, but it is quite different to say that the privilege is cut down
and impaired by detention and to say a man’s will has been so overborne a
confession is forced from him. . . .
. . . [I]f we go back to the totality of circumstances, that means this Court will sit
all by itself as it has so many years to overturn the few confessions it can take. . . .
The lower courts won’t do their job. We need some specific guidelines . . . to
help them along the way.75

Justice Harlan did not ask a follow-up question. But later, when he wrote his dissenting
opinion in Miranda, he observed that “[h]aving decided that the Fifth Amendment privilege does
apply in the police station, the Court reveals that privilege imposes more exacting restrictions

74

The Miranda opinion was actually an opinion for four consolidated cases: Miranda,
California v. Stewart, Vignera v. New York, and Westover v. United States.
75

See YALE KAMISAR, et al., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , 457, 460-61 (10th ed. 2002)
(extracts from oral arguments in Miranda and companion cases).
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than does the Fourteenth Amendment’s voluntariness test.”76
The difficulties a defendant faced in establishing that his confession was coerced or
involuntary was a principal reason why many considered the due process/totality of the
circumstances test inadequate.77 That is also why at the time of Miranda law enforcement
officials preferred the old test and resisted the application of the self-incrimination clause to
custodial police interrogation. And that is why, too, Ernesto Miranda’s confession was held
inadmissible – despite the fact that the police questioning of him had been quite mild compared
to the harsher and more offensive police methods that had barred the use of statements in the
cases applying the old voluntariness test.
If Tucker’s view of Miranda were the correct one – if statements were “compelled” in
violation of the privilege only if they were deemed “coerced” or “involuntary” under traditional
due process standards – it is hard to see what Miranda would have accomplished by applying the
privilege against self-incrimination to the proceedings in the police station. If the privilege were
violated only when the confession was obtained under circumstances that made it coerced or
involuntary under the pre-Miranda test for the admissibility of confessions, why was the decision
in Miranda much-awaited, much-discussed and much-criticized? Why did it matter whether or
not the privilege applied to the police station?
THE APPARENT DECONSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF MIRANDA

76

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 511.

77

See Stone, supra, at 102-03. See also Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda
Dissents, 65 Mich.L.Rev. 59, 67-76 (1966); Stephen J. Schulholfer, Confessions and the Court,
79 Mich.L.Rev. 865, 867-78 (1981); Welsh S. White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?,
50 Rutgers L.Rev. 2001 (1998).
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Although Tucker turned out to be a highly significant case – its way of viewing and
talking about Miranda was to be used repeatedly to downsize Miranda and establish exceptions
to it – it seems fairly clear that at least some of the Justices who concurred in the result had no
idea how much damage Tucker would ultimately do to Miranda.
From the point of view of the prosecution, Tucker was just about the most appealing case
imaginable. The defendant had been questioned and had confessed before Miranda was decided,
although his trial had taken place afterwards. Thus, Miranda was just barely applicable.78
Second, the police had only failed to give the defendant one of the four Miranda warnings
– the advice that he would be provided free counsel if he could not afford counsel himself. No
police officer could be faulted for that omission at that time – two months before the Miranda
case was handed down.
Finally, Tucker did not deal with the admissibility of the defendant’s own statements –
they had been excluded – but only with the testimony of a witness whose identity had been
discovered by questioning the defendant without giving him a complete set of Miranda warnings.
Of all the kinds of evidence derived from police misconduct (and it would be a stretch to so
characterize the police action in Tucker), the testimony of a “tainted” witness, i.e., one located as
a result of police misconduct, seems the most attenuated.79
The special facts of Tucker explain why only one member of the Court, Justice Douglas,

78

In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), the Court ruled that Miranda affected
only those cases in which the trial began after that decision was handed down. This was a
mistake. The Court probably should have held that Miranda affected only those confessions
obtained by police questioning conducted after the date of the decision.
79

See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
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dissented. (Douglas argued that a confession obtained in violation of Miranda had to be a
confession obtained in violation of constitutional standards because “[t]he Court is not free to
prescribe preferred modes of interrogation [for the states] absent a constitutional basis.”80
Rehnquist did not respond to Douglas, but two and a half decades later, in Dickerson, he was to
make essentially the same argument in defense of Miranda’s constitutionality).
Justice White concurred in the result in Tucker on the ground that Miranda did not deal
with the testimony of witnesses derived from statements obtained in violation of that case and he
would not extend Miranda that far.81 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, also concurred
in the result, maintaining that the rule applying Miranda to trials begun after the date of that
decision should not extend to derivative evidence but be confined to “those cases in which the
direct statements of an accused made during a pre-Miranda interrogation were introduced at his
post-Miranda trial.”82
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Tucker was the opinion of the Court only because Justice
Stewart joined it. Stewart pointed out, however, that he “could also join” Justice Brennan’s
concurring opinion, for it struck him that “despite differences in phraseology, and despite the
disclaimers of their respective authors,” the two opinions “proceed on virtually parallel lines.”83
At one point, Justice Rehnquist informed us that he “consider[ed] it significant to our

80

417 U.S. at 462.

81

See id. at 460 (White, J. concurring).

82

Id. at 458 (Brennan, J., concurring).

83

Id. at 453 (Stewart, J., joining the opinion of the Court and writing a one-paragraph
concurring opinion).
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decision” in Tucker “that the officers’ failure to advise respondent of his right to appointed
counsel occurred prior to the decision in Miranda.”84 He also told us that rather than “resolve the
broad question of whether evidence derived from statements taken in violation of the Miranda
rules must be excluded regardless of when the interrogation took place,” the Court would
“instead place [its] holding on a narrower ground” – the fact that “at the time respondent was
questioned these police officers were guided, quite rightly, by [pre-Miranda] principles.”85
Although, again speaking for the Court, Justice Rehnquist relied heavily on Tucker in
New York v. Quarles (the case that established a “public safety” exception to Miranda)86 and
made sure to quote Tucker’s language to the effect that “[t]he prophylactic Miranda warnings . . .
are ‘not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that
the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected,’”87 he did not mention any of the
unusual facts in Tucker – facts that he himself had said greatly contributed to the Tucker holding.
Nor, a year later, did Justice O’Connor do so when, in Oregon v. Elstad,88 she, too, chanted the
Tucker mantra that “[t]he prophylactic Miranda warnings are ‘not themselves rights protected by

84

Id. at 447.

85

Id. The key case at the time the police questioned Mr. Tucker was Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964), and that case had focused on the suspect’s right to have retained counsel
with him during the police interrogation. Thus, in Tucker, “the police asked respondent if he
wanted counsel, and he answered that he did not.” Id.
86

467 U.S. 649 (1984).

87

Id. at 654.

88

470 U.S. 298 (1985).
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the Constitution.’”89
In Elstad, a 6-3 majority, speaking through Justice O’Connor declined to apply the “fruit
of the poisonous tree” doctrine to a “second confession” (one immediately preceded by the
Miranda warnings) following a confession obtained an hour earlier without giving the defendant
the required warnings. Although Justice O’Connor relied heavily on Justice Rehnquist’s
opinions in Tucker and Quarles, she seemed to be even more emphatic about Miranda’s
subconstitutional status than he was.
The Elstad Court chided the state court for having “misconstrued” the protections
afforded by Miranda by assuming that “a failure to administer Miranda warnings necessarily
breeds the same consequences as police infringement of a constitutional right, so that evidence
uncovered following an unwarned statement must be suppressed as ‘fruit of the poisonous
tree.’”90 There is, Justice O’Connor emphasized, “a vast difference between the direct
consequences flowing from coercion of a confession by physical violence [and] the uncertain
consequences of disclosure of a ‘guilty secret’ freely given in response to an unwarned but
noncoercive question, as in this case.”91 At one point, she described a person whose Miranda
rights had been violated as someone “who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm.”92

89

Id. at 305.

90

Id. at 304.

91

Id. at 312.

92

See id. At 307: “[Under Miranda], unwarned statements that are otherwise voluntary
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be excluded. . . . Thus, in the
individual case, Miranda’s preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant who
has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm.”
26

https://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art33

26

Kamisar:

Justice O’Connor also observed:
Respondent’s [“fruit of the poisonous tree” argument] assumes the existence of a
constitutional violation. . . . But as we explained in Quarles and Tucker, a
procedural Miranda violation differs in significant respect from violations of the
Fourth Amendment, which have traditionally mandated a broad application of the
“fruits” doctrine. . . .93

The Miranda exclusionary rule . . . serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more
broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It may be triggered even in the absence
of a Fifth Amendment violation. . . .94

If errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic
Miranda procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable consequences
as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself.95

Although Elstad can be read fairly narrowly,96 the majority opinion seems to say – it
certainly can plausibly be read as saying – that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of a real
constitutional right, but only a procedural safeguard or prophylactic rule designed to protect a
constitutional right. Therefore, unlike evidence derived from an unreasonable search or a
coerced confession(in the traditional due process sense) – which are real constitutional violations
– it is not entitled to, or worthy of, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine.
When § 3501 was enacted, few, if any, had taken it seriously. One of the nation’s leading

93

Id. at 305-06.

94

Id. at 306.

95

Id. at 309.

96

At the very end of her opinion, id. at 318, Justice O’Connor states: “We hold today that
a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby
disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda
warnings.”
27

Published by Digital USD, 2005

27

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 33 [2005]

constitutional law scholars, and one whose criticism of the bill containing the anti-Miranda
section “was especially weighty” because he was “unsympathetic with the Miranda decision,”97
concluded that offensive as § 3501 was, it did not justify a veto of the bill because it was so
likely to be held “constitutionally ineffective” that –
[n]o responsible trial judge would jeopardize a criminal conviction by following
the statute in his rulings on admissibility, nor would a sensible prosecutor even
seek a ruling in these terms since it would certainly invite reversal.98

A decade and a half later, however, the Burger Court’s characterization of Miranda and
its comments about the case gave reason to believe that § 3501 might survive constitutional
attack after all.
It had all started with Tucker, a case whose facts read like a law professor’s exam
question, a case where the police could hardly have been expected to anticipate all the Miranda
warnings, a case which never would have arisen if the Court had thought through its retroactivity
jurisprudence.99 Then came Quarles and Elstad.
When the Warren Court’s revolution in criminal procedure was at its height, Judge Henry
Friendly complained about what he called “the domino method of constitutional adjudication” –
a method that made a case that was extremely appealing from the defendant’s pespecive the

97

Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal §76 at 187 n. 30 (3d ed.

1999).
98

Herbert Wechsler, Letter to the Editor: Legislating Crime Control, N.Y. Times, June
16, 1968, at B 19.
99

A year after Miranda, the Court seemed to realize its mistake. It applied the new rules
governing lineups announced in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), to identification
procedures (not trials) conducted after the date Wade was handed down. See Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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occasion for a general expansion of the rights of the accused.100 (Friendly thought the Court
should handle the extremely appealing case on an individualized basis.)
During the Burger Court era, however, it became the turn of the defense-minded to
complain about the Court’s use of a very sympathetic case from the prosecution’s perspective
(and it is hard to think of a better example than Tucker) as the occasion to contract the rights of
the accused or to throw some dirt on landmark decisions like Miranda. Moreover, the defenseminded couldn’t help wondering whether some day the domino effect of Tucker, Quarles and
Elstad would end with the overruling of Miranda.
FROM TUCKER TO DICKERSON
– AND BACK AGAIN

In 1999, despite the fact that the Justice Department had instructed the United States
Attorney’s office not to rely on § 3501, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in United States v. Dickerson,101 held that a confession was admissible under that
statutory provision. In sustaining the constitutionality of § 3501, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily
on the fact that the post-Warren Court had “consistently (and repeatedly) . . . referred to the
[Miranda] warnings as ‘prophylactic’ . . . and ‘not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution.’”102 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit went so far as to say that § 3601 had been “enacted

100

See Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif.
L.Rev. 929, 950, 954-55 & n. 135 (1965).
101

166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), overruled, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).

102

Id. at 689.
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at the invitation of the Supreme Court.”103
When the Dickerson case reached the Supreme Court, the Department of Justice refused
to defend the constitutionality of § 3501. Instead, during the oral arguments in the Supreme
Court, Solicitor General Seth Waxman attacked the reasoning of Tucker and its progeny early
and often. Again and again, he explained how Miranda is a constitutional decision even though
the Miranda warnings are not constitutionally required. The warnings, he pointed out, would not
be constitutionally required if Congress or a state legislature were to come up with a suitable
substitute (perhaps a videotape system, time limits or questioning by magistrates). In the absence
of an effective alternative, however, emphasized the Solicitor General, the warnings are
required.104

To the surprise of some (including me), Justice O’Connor, author of the majority opinion
in Elstad, joined a 7-2 majority opinion “conclud[ing] that Miranda announced a constitutional
rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively.”105 To the surprise of many (especially me),
Chief Justice Rehnquist, author of the Tucker and Quarles opinions, wrote the opinion of the
Court.
The Chief Justice put on a remarkable display of nimble backpedaling.
What about the reasoning in Tucker and Quarles and what Rehnquist had said about
Miranda in those cases? In Dickerson, Rehnquist dismissed his Tucker and Quarles opinions in

103

Id. at 672. See also id. at 688-89.

104

Transcript of Oral Arguments in Dickerson, pp. 6-8.

105

530 U.S. at 444.
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one sentence:
Relying on the fact that we have created several exceptions to Miranda’s warnings
requirement and that we have repeatedly referred to the Miranda warnings as
“prophylactic” [citing Quarles] and “not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution” [citing Tucker], the Court of Appeals concluded that the protections
announced in Miranda are not constitutionally required.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals conclusion, although we concede that
there is some language in some of our opinions that supports the view taken by
that court.106

I doubt that any Justice in Supreme Court history has dismissed his own majority
opinions more summarily or nonchalantly.
In Tucker, Rehnquist maintained that the fact that the Miranda Court stated that it would
not say that “‘the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the
inherent compulsion of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted’”107 was proof that
“[t]he [Miranda] Court recognized that these procedural rights were not themselves protected by
the Constitution.”108 But in Dickerson the fact that the Miranda Court invited the Congress to
consider equally effective alternatives to the Miranda warnings somehow cut the other way:
“Additional support for our conclusion that Miranda is constitutionally based is found in the
Miranda Court’s invitation for legislative action to protect the constitutional right against

106

Id. at 437-38.

107

417 U.S. at 444, quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.

108

417 U.S. at 444.
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coerced self-incrimination.”109
Some portions of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Dickerson opinion read as if he had read the
Miranda opinion closely for the first time or thought about it intensely for the first time.
In Tucker, as Professor Stone has pointed out, “[t]he only evidence Mr. Justice Rehnquist
offered to support his conclusion [that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the privilege]
was the Court’s statement in Miranda that the Constitution does not necessarily
require ‘adherence to any particular solution’ to the problem of custodial interrogation.”110 In
Tucker, he failed to mention that the Miranda Court had made it clear that “any particular
solution” other than the Miranda warnings had to be at least as effective as the Miranda
warnings. Chief Justice Rehnquist did not make that mistake in Dickerson: “[The Miranda
Court] opined that the Constitution would not preclude legislative solutions that differed from
the prescribed Miranda warnings but which were ‘at least as effective in apprising accused
persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it.’”111
Are we supposed to believe that when Justice Rehnquist wrote his opinion in Tucker he
was unaware that the Miranda opinion had stated that unless alternatives were devised by the
legislature that were fully as effective as the warnings the fourfold warnings were constitutionally
required? The Miranda Court issued the caveat that any alternatives to the warnings had to be
“fully as effective” or “at least as effective” as the warnings were in apprising custodial suspects

109

530 U.S. at 440. As pointed out earlier, the Dickerson Court should have referred to
the constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination; “coercion” is a term of art used
when the Court is applying the traditional due process test.
110

Stone, supra, at 119 (emphasis added).

111

530 U.S. at 440, quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added).
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of their right of silence and assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise that right as many as
five times!112
In Dickerson, Chief Justice Rehnquist points out that the Miranda opinion “is replete
with statements indicating that the majority thought it was announcing a constitutional rule.”113
“Indeed,” he continues, “the Court’s ultimate conclusion was that the unwarned confessions
obtained in the four cases before the Court in Miranda ‘were obtained from the defendant under
circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege.’”114
Are we supposed to believe that Justice Rehnquist did not know the Miranda opinion
contained the language referred to above when he told us in Tucker that the Miranda Court itself
“recognized that these procedural safeguards [the Miranda warnings] were not themselves rights
protected by the Constitution”?115
In Dickerson, Chief Justice Rehnquist told us that “first and foremost of the factors on the
other side – that Miranda is a constitutional decision – is that both Miranda and two of its
companion cases applied the rule to proceedings in state courts – to wit, Arizona, California, and
New York.”116 Since the Supreme Court has no supervisory authority over state courts, reasoned
Rehnquist, the Miranda Court must have announced a constitutional rule.117

112

See 384 U.S. at 444, 467, 476, 478 and 490.

113

530 U.S. at 439.

114

Id. at 439-40.

115

417 U.S. at 444.

116

530 U.S. at 438.

117

See id. at 437-48.
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“First and foremost of the factors . . . that Miranda is a constitutional decision”? If so,
why didn’t Justice Rehnquist take this into account when he wrote about Miranda’s
constitutional status (or lack of it) in Tucker and Quarles? Justice Douglas made the same point
Justice Rehnquist was to make many years later when Douglas dissented in Tucker.118 Justice
Stevens also made the same point when he dissented in Elstad.119 Are we supposed to believe
that in the 1970s and 1980s Justice Rehnquist didn’t realize the significance of the fact that
Miranda’s full name was Miranda v. Arizona?
Why did Chief Justice Rehnquist, who could hardly be called a friend of Miranda, come
to its rescue?120
The Chief Justice might have regarded Dickerson as an occasion for the Court to maintain
its power against Congress.121 But that doesn’t explain the Rehnquists’ and six other Justices’

118

See text at note 80 supra.

119

Observed Justice Stevens, dissenting in Elstad, 470 U.S. at 370-71: “This Court’s
power to require state courts to exclude probative self-incriminatory statements rests entirely on
the premise that the use of such evidence violates the Federal Constitution. The same
constitutional analysis applies whether the custodial interrogation is actually coercive or
irrebuttably presumed to be coercive. [Otherwise, the Court] must regard the holding in the
Miranda case itself, as well as all of the federal jurisprudence that has evolved from that
decision, as nothing more than an illegitimate exercise of raw judicial power.”
120

Of course, there is always the possibility that he would not have voted this way if the
Court had been split 4-4 and he could have cast the pivotal vote. He might have voted in favor of
Miranda so that he could assign the opinion to himself, rather than let someone like Justice
Stevens write the opinion of the Court. But I shall proceed on the premise that Chief Justice
Rehnquist would have voted the way he did regardless of how his colleagues were voting.
121

See Craig Bradley, Behind the Dickerson Decision, Trial, Oct. 2000, at 80; Michael C.
Dorf & Barry Freedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2001 Sup.Ct.Rev. 61, 72.
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unwillingness “to overrule Miranda ourselves.”122
Was the Chief Justice concerned that the “overruling” of Miranda would have wiped out
more than three decades of confession jurisprudence – and almost 60 cases? Was this worth
doing when the police had come to learn to live fairly comfortably with Miranda?123 The Chief
Justice must have been aware that the police obtain waiver of rights in the “overwhelming
majority” of cases and that once they do “Miranda offers very little protection.”124
Then there is my favorite reason why Chief Justice Rehnquist and six of his colleagues
voted the way that they did: Overruling Miranda after all these years would have caused
enormous confusion.125
The due process/voluntariness totality of the circumstances test had become “increasingly
meticulous through the years.”126 One week after Miranda, in the course of declining to apply
that case retroactively, but only to trials begun after the decision was announced, Chief Justice
Warren had pointed out that the traditional “voluntariness” test “now takes specific account of

122

530 U.S. at 444.

123

According to Professor Richard A. Leo, a close student of police interrogation and
confessions, and a leading commentator on the subject, Questioning the relevance of Miranda in
the Twenty-First Century, 69 Mich.L.Rev. 975, 1027 (2001): “Once feared to be the equivalent
of sand in the machinery of criminal justice, Miranda has now become a standard part of the
machine.”
124

Id. See also William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 Mich.L.Rev. 975, 977 (2001).

125

See Yale Kamisar, Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later: A Close Look at the Majority and
Dissenting Opinions in Dickerson, 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 387, 388-90 (2001).
126

Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966). Consider, too, Miranda, 384 U.S. at
508 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“synopses of the cases [applying the pre-Miranda voluntariness test]
would serve little use because the overall gage has been steadily changing, usually in the
direction of restricting admissibility.”)
35

Published by Digital USD, 2005

35

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 33 [2005]

the failure to advise the accused of his privilege against self-incrimination or to allow him access
to outside assistance.”127
If Miranda had been overturned in Dickerson, it would have been extremely difficult for
a police officer to know how to respond when (a) a suspect not warned of her rights had asserted
what she thought were her rights or (b) asked the police whether she had a right to remain silent
or c) whether the police had a right to get answers from her or (d) whether she could meet with a
lawyer before answering any questions or (e) whether the officer would prevent her from trying
to contact a lawyer.
If the Court had wiped out Miranda – after the police had worked with and relied on that
landmark case for more than three decades – I venture to say the situation in the “interview
room” would have been close to chaotic.
G
Although it finally said “good riddance” to a 38-year-old statutory provision that
purported to “overrule” Miranda, the Dickerson Court left a number of questions unanswered. It
is hard to improve on Professor Donald Dripps’s comment:
Once the Court granted [certiorari in Dickerson], court-watchers knew the hour
had come. At long last the Court would have to either repudiate Miranda,
repudiate the prophylactic-rule cases, or offer some ingenious reconciliation of the
two lines of precedent. The Supreme Court of the United States, however, doesn’t
“have to” do anything, as the decision in Dickerson once again reminds us.128

127

Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 730 (1966) (emphasis added). Se also id. at 731:
“[P]ast decisions treated the failure to warn accused persons of their rights, or the failure to grant
them access to outside assistance, as factors tending to prove the involuntariness of the resulting
confession.”
128

Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional theory for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda,
and the Continuing Quest for Broad-But-Shallow, 43 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 1, 33 (2001).
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Logically, Dickerson undermines the holdings in the prophylactic-rule cases, especially
Elstad, which repeatedly emphasized that Miranda was a subconstitutional rule.

But the Chief

Justice did not repudiate any of the prophylactic-rule cases. Indeed, he labored hard to avoid
doing so.129 But he did not approve of the reasoning in those cases either. How could he?
Rehnquist’s one attempt to explain Elstad in light of Dickerson – and most commentators
agree that it was an extremely feeble attempt – 130 was to say:
Our decision in that case [Elstad] – refusing to apply the traditional “fruits”
doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases –does not prove that Miranda is a
nonconstitutional decision, but simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable
searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation
under the Fifth Amendment.131

But why is a statement obtained in violation of the Miranda rules “different from”
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment? As far as the “fruit of the poisonous

129

See id. at 62.

130

Indeed, Professor Susan Klein commented, with considerable justification, that Chief
Justice’s attempt to explain why the “poisonous tree” doctrine developed in search and seizure
cases doesn’t apply to Miranda violations “comes dangerously close to being a non sequitur.”
Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and
Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 Mich.L.Rev. 1030, 1073 (2001).
The fact that the Chief Justice’s attempt to reconcile Elstad with the “constitutionalized”
Miranda doctrine was inadequate does not mean, however, that no tenable explanations exist.
As David Strauss has suggested, one might have said that although Miranda strikes the best
balance of advantages and disadvantages in the circumstances presented, a different balance
might be best in the Elstad circumstances. As Professor Strauss observed, “The fact that the
Court refined the balance it struck in Miranda, when cases presenting different circumstances
arose, has no bearing on the constitutional status or legitimacy of that decision.” David A.
Strauss, Miranda, The Constitution, and Congress, 99 Mich. L.Rev. 958, 969 (2001).
131

530 U.S. at 441.
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tree” doctrine is concerned, there is nothing inherently different between a coerced statement or
one obtained in violation of the privilege on the one hand and a violation of the Fourth
Amendment on the other.
Last year Chief Justice Rehnquist joined a plurality opinion by Justice Thomas which
recognized that “the physical fruit of actually coerced statements” must be excluded.132 In the
same case, Deputy Solicitor General Michael Dreeben conceded that if, in response to a grand
jury subpoena, a person under threat of contempt of court revealed the existence of a gun, the
weapon, as well as the statement itself, would have to be excluded.133
The only difference the Elstad Court recognized was one between a violation of the
Constitution and a violation of a rule or set of rules lacking constitutional status, notably
Miranda. But didn’t Dickerson change that?
If, as the Dickerson Court seems to have told us, in the absence of an equally effective
alternative procedure (and nobody claims there was an effective alternative in Elstad or
Dickerson), the Miranda warnings are constitutionally required – are “constitutional standards
for protection of the privilege” – then a breach of the warnings does amount to a breach of the
Constitution – and the distinction the Elstad Court repeatedly made is no longer valid.
This point did not escape dissenting Justice Scalia: Unless one agrees with the Elstad
Court that “Miranda violations are not constitutional violations,”134 it would be hard to explain
why the “fruits” doctrine applies to the fruits of illegal searches but not to the fruits of Miranda

132

United States v. Patane, 124 S.Ct. 2620, 2630 (2004).

133

Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, United States v. Patane.

134

530 U.S. at 455 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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violations “since it is not clear on the face of the Fourth Amendment that evidence obtained in
violation of that guarantee must be excluded from trial, whereas it is clear on the face of the Fifth
Amendment that unconstitutionally compelled confessions cannot be used.”135
G
Nevertheless, a recent Miranda “poisoned fruit” case, Untied States v. Patane,136 leaves
little doubt that Elstad has survived Dickerson completely unscathed.
The Patane case arose as follows: Without administering a complete set of Miranda
warnings, a detective questioned defendant Patane about the location of a Glock pistol he was
supposed to own. Patane responded that the weapon was on a shelf in his bedroom. This
admission led almost immediately to the seizure of the weapon where the defendant said it was.
The prosecution conceded that Patane’s statement was inadmissible, but argued that the physical
fruit of the failure to comply with Miranda – the pistol itself – should be admitted. A unanimous
panel of the Tenth Circuit disagreed, concluding that “Miranda’s deterrent purpose would not be
vindicated meaningfully by suppression only of Patane’s statement.”137

135

Id. See also Dripps, supra, at 35: “The Chief Justice must know . . . that the Fifth
Amendment exclusionary rule for fruits under Kastigar [v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972)] is
more strict, not more lax, than the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. The difference between
the Fourth and Fifth Amendment exclusionary rules cut against, not in favor of, reconciling
Elstad with Miranda, Dickerson, and Kastigar.”
As Professor Dripps points out elsewhere in his article, see id. at 31, Kastigar makes it quite
clear that immunity for testimony compelled by formal process before a grand jury would not be
constitutional if evidence derived from compelled testimony were admissible.
136

124 S.Ct. 2620 (2004).

137

Patane v. United States, 304 F.3d 1013, 1029 (10th Cir. 2002) (Ebel, J.,) rev’d, 124
S.Ct. 2620 (2004).
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The government relied on both Tucker and Elstad, but judge Ebel, who wrote the Tenth
Circuit opinion, thought that neither case was still good law: “Both Tucker and Elstad “were
predicated upon the premise that the Miranda rule was a prophylactic rule, rather than a
constitutional rule” whereas the “poisonous tree” doctrine “requires suppression only of the fruits
of unconstitutional conduct.” However, continued Judge Ebel, “the premise upon which Tucker
and Elstad relied was fundamentally altered in Dickerson. [That case] undermined the logic
underlying Tucker and Elstad.138
Those of you who have come with me this far know that I think Judge Ebel’s reading of
Dickerson is a plausible, sensible one – indeed a perfectly logical one. Unfortunately, I don’t
have any votes on the Supreme Court – and five people who do disagreed.
There was no opinion of the Court. Justice Thomas, who wrote a three-Justice plurality
opinion, announced the judgment of the Court and delivered a three-Justice plurality opinion.
The Court was able to reverse the Tenth Circuit only because Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice
O’Connor, concurred in the judgment.
The fact that Justice Scalia joined Thomas’s plurality opinion is not surprising. The fact
that the Chief Justice did is. In a post-Dickerson confession case, the two dissenters in Dickerson
and the author of the majority opinion in Dickerson make strange bedfellows.
At no time in Dickerson did Chief Justice Rehnquist contrast the prophylactic rules of
Miranda with the “actual Self-Incrimination Clause.” Nor, in Dickerson, did he ever contrast
Miranda violations with a “core” violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause itself. Indeed, at no

138

Id. at 1019.
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time in Dickerson did Rehnquist call the Miranda rules “prophylactic.”139
However, in his Patane plurality opinion, Justice Thomas repeatedly characterizes the
Miranda rules as “prophylactic”140 and repeatedly refers to “the core protection afforded by the
Self-Incrimination Clause,”141 “the core privilege against self-incrimination”142 protected by
prophylactic rules, “the actual right against compelled self-incrimination”143 and “actual
violations of the Due Process Clause or the Self-Incrimination Clause.”144
Justice Thomas also tells us in language very similar to that used in Elstad, that because
prophylactic rules such as the Miranda rule “necessarily sweep beyond the actual protections of
the Self-Incrimination Clause, any further extension of these rules must be justified by its
necessity for the protection of the actual right against compelled self-incrimination.145
To be sure, Justice Thomas only wrote for three Justices. But Miranda supporters will
gain little comfort from Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion.
Although he did not, as Thomas had done, contrast Miranda’s “prophylactic rules” with
the “core privilege” or “actual right against compelled self-incrimination,” Kennedy did not seem
at all troubled by the fact that the plurality had reiterated the old Tucker-Quarles-Elstad rhetoric
139

In Dickerson the Chief Justice did note that earlier cases had characterized the Miranda
rules as “prophylactic.”
140

See 124 S.Ct. at 2626, 2627, 2630.

141

Id. at 2626.

142

Id. at 2627.

143

Id.

144

Id. at 2529.

145

Id. at 2627.
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about Miranda four years after Dickerson. Nor did Kennedy give any indication that he thought
Dickerson had any bearing on the case.
Justice Kennedy did mention Dickerson once – but only to say that he “agree[d] with the
plurality that Dickerson did not undermine [cases like Elstad and Quarles] and, in fact, cited
[those cases] in support.”146 (In support of what? Surely not Dickerson’s holding that Miranda
is a constitutional decision).
Not only did Justice Kennedy fail to question the soundness of Elstad’s reasoning in light
of Dickerson, he actually praised Elstad. The result in cases like Elstad, he told us, cases
upholding the admissibility of evidence obtained “following an unwarned interrogation,” was
“based in large part on our recognition that the concerns underlying the Miranda rule must be
accommodated to other objectives of the criminal justice system.”147
Have I overlooked the companion case to the Patane case, Missouri v. Seibert?148 I think
not. In Seibert, a 5-4 majority did uphold the suppression of a so-called second confession, one
obtained after the police had deliberately used a two-stage interrogation technique designed to
undermine the Miranda warning. But Justice Souter, who wrote a four-Justice plurality opinion,
never relied on Dickerson. His opinion is written just as if Dickerson had never been decided.
Nor did Souter ever question the continued validity of Elstad. Indeed, at one point he treated
Elstad with some reverence. In the course of rejecting Ms. Seibert’s argument that her
confession should be excluded under the “poisonous tree” doctrine developed in Wong Sun v.

146

Id. at 2631 (emphasis added).

147

Id.

148

124 S.Ct. 2601 (2004).
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United States,149 Justice Souter reminded the defendant that Elstad had “rejected the Wong Sun
fruits doctrine for analyzing the admissibility of a subsequent warned confession following ‘an
initial failure to administer the warnings required by Miranda.’”150
The Seibert facts were easy to distinguish from Elstad’s and Justice Souter did so. The
failure to advise Mr. Elstad of his Miranda rights the first time seemed inadvertent. At one point
Justice O’Connor called it an “oversight.”151 This was a far cry from Seibert.
As I have observed elsewhere, the decision in Seibert turns on its extreme facts and
would have turned on these same facts even if Dickerson had never been written:
The officer involved had “resort[ed] to an interrogation technique he had been
taught.” At the first questioning session he had made “a ‘conscious decision’ to
withhold Miranda warnings” and after obtaining incriminating statements, had
called a short recess (twenty minutes) before resuming the questioning. At the
outset of the second session the officer did advise the suspect of her rights, and
did obtain a waiver, but he then confronted the suspect with the statements she
had made during the first session (when she had not been warned of her rights).
Not surprisingly, the suspect confessed again. The new statement was “‘largely a
repeat of information . . . obtained’ prior to the warnings.”
The failure to comply with Miranda was so deliberate and so flagrant that an 8-1
or 7-2 ruling in favor of the defense would not have been surprising. The fact that
the vote on these extreme facts was 5-4 and that the derivative evidence was held
inadmissible only because of Justice Kennedy’s somewhat grudging concurring
opinion is significant evidence of the low state to which Miranda has fallen.152
It should be noted that although he concurred in the Seibert judgment, Justice Kennedy

149

371 U.S. 471 (1963).

150

Id. at 2610 n. 4.

151

Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316.

152

Yale Kamisar, Postscript: Another Look at Patane and Seibert, the 2004 Miranda
“Poisoned Fruit” Cases, 2 Ohio St.J.Crim.L. 97, 108 (2004).
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took no more cognizance of Dickerson than he did when he concurred in the result in Patane.
And in Seibert, too, he had nice things to say about Elstad. That case, he maintained, “was
correct in its reasoning and its result. Elstad reflects a balanced and pragmatic approach to
enforcement of the Miranda warning.”153 And he left no doubt that in the typical “second
confession” case he would admit the evidence.154
G
A final word about Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion in Patane. At one point, he
discusses and quotes from a number of cases that have read Miranda narrowly and/or established
exceptions to it. Then, in case we haven’t quite grasped his message, he tells us: “Finally,
nothing in Dickerson, including its characterization of Miranda as announcing a constitutional
rule, changes any of these observations.155
Why not? Aside from invalidating § 3501, did Dickerson accomplish anything? A
majority of the Court seems to think not. Indeed, Patane and Seibert leave us wondering whether
any member of the Court believes that Dickerson affected Tucker, Quarles or Elstad – or, for that
matter, any of the nearly sixty confession cases the Court has handed down since Miranda was
decided. To borrow a line from Justice Roberts, Dickerson seems to be a decision good for “this
day and train only.”156
G

153

124 S.Ct. At 2615.

154

See id. At 2616.

155

124 S.Ct. At 2628.

156

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J. dissenting).
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It is not too surprising that only four years after Dickerson was decided Justice Thomas
would more or less shrug off that case. After all, Thomas did join Justice Scalia’s long, forceful
dissent in Dickerson. What is quite surprising, however, is that the Chief Justice, the author of
the majority opinion in Dickerson, would join Thomas’s plurality opinion in Patane.
It is hard to believe that any Justice could write an opinion of the Court “reject[ing] the
core premises of Miranda,”157 and establishing the groundwork for its overruling,158 only to come
to its rescue a quarter-century later. It is also hard to believe that any Justice could write an
opinion of the Court advancing almost every argument conceivable for why Miranda must be
said to have announced a constitutional rule only to concur four years later in an opinion written
by a colleague neither impressed by, nor even interested in, what that Justice had to say four
years earlier. It is doubly astonishing when we are talking about the same Justice.
Despite the fact that he wrote the opinion of the Court in Dickerson, Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s majority opinions in Tucker and Quarles make him the Justice who has probably
contributed more to the depreciation of Miranda than any other member of the Court. Those
opinions drove a wedge between the Miranda rules and the privilege against self-incrimination.
There was reason to believe that Dickerson had removed that wedge. But it is hard to miss
Patane’s message that the wedge is still there – or has been reinserted.
Moreover, because he wrote the majority opinions in Tucker and Quarles, then
flipflopped in Dickerson and then flipflopped again in Patane, the Chief Justice has probably
contributed more to the confusion over Miranda than any other member of the Court.
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Stone, supra, at 118.
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See id. at 123.
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